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Implicit Quotas
Roland G. Fryer, Jr.
ABSTRACT
Employment or admission “goals” are often preferred to afﬁrmative action asa way ofobtaining
diversity. By constructing a simple model of employer-auditor interaction, I show that when
an auditor has imperfect information regarding employers’ proclivities to discriminate and the
fraction of qualiﬁed minorities in each employer’s applicant pool, goals are synonymous with
quotas. Technically speaking, any equilibrium of the auditing game involves a nonempty set
of employers who hire so that they do not trigger an audit by rejecting qualiﬁed nonminorities,
hiring unqualiﬁed minorities, or both. Further, under some assumptions, explicit quotas (those
mandated by an auditor) are more efﬁcient than implicit quotas (goals settledoninequilibrium
by employers wishing to avoid an audit).
Since President Nixon was here in my job, America has used
goals and timetables to preserve opportunity and to prevent
discrimination, to urge businesses to set higher expectations
for themselves and to realize those expectations. But we did
not and we will not use rigid quotas to mandate outcomes.
[President William J. Clinton, July 19, 1995]
I am for Afﬁrmative Action, as I describe it, but not for quotas
or preferences. [President George W. Bush, April 2, 2000]
We do not think it matters whether a government hiring pro-
gram imposes hard quotas, soft quotas, or goals. Any of these
techniques induces an employer to hire with an eye toward
meeting the numerical target. [Judge Laurence Silberman, Lu-
theran Church–Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344 (D.C.
Cir. 1998)]
ROLAND G. FRYER, JR., is Professor of Economics at Harvard University and Faculty
Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research. I would like to thank
Lavone Norwood, Corporate Executive Director of Employee Relations, for extensive dis-2 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 38 (1) / JANUARY 2009
1. INTRODUCTION
In its 40-year history, there have been many popular misconceptions
about afﬁrmative action, including the following: (1) the only way to
create a color-blind society is to adopt color-blind means, (2) afﬁrmative
action may have been necessary 30 years ago, but the playing ﬁeld is
fairly level now, (3) the public does not support afﬁrmative action any-
more, (4) a large percentage of white workers will lose out if afﬁrmative
action is continued, and (5) goals and timelines are better than rigid
afﬁrmative action quotas. The ﬁrst four misconceptionshavebeenshown
to be more myth than fact (Fryer and Loury 2005; Fryer, Loury, and
Yuret 2008; Loury 1977). Yet goals are thought to be good-faith efforts
on the part of noble employers, whereas quotas are envisioned as rigid
racial diversity requirements that often result inthehiringofincompetent
minorities. In its landmark decision Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke (438 U.S. 265 [1978]), the Supreme Court ruled such
inﬂexible quotas to be unconstitutional, while it upheld the use of soft
quotas, or goals, in Fullilove v. Klutznick (448 U.S. 448 [1980]). Un-
derstanding the relationship between these amorphous terms is the sub-
ject of this paper.
To get beneath the terminology, I develop a model of employer-
auditor interaction that involves imperfect auditing of an employer’s
hiring practices. Employers differ in their proclivities to discriminate and
in the fraction of qualiﬁed minorities who apply for positions in their
ﬁrms. After observing its own type (desire to discriminate and applicant
pool), each employer hires a ratio of minorities to nonminorities. Thus,
if an employer hires a small share of minorities, it implies one of two
things: the employer is either a discriminator who rejected somequaliﬁed
minority candidates or a nondiscriminator who had a small fraction of
qualiﬁed minorities apply. I assume that an outside auditor cannot dis-
tinguish perfectly between these states—even after an audit. The auditor
observes each employer’s workforce and decides whether to conduct an
audit. So, in an effort to eliminate discrimination, the auditor will mis-
cussions on auditing processes, Mary Leone, Director of Equal Employment Opportunity/
Afﬁrmative Action compliance, and several anonymous employers for helpful suggestions.
I would also like to thank Gary Becker, Kalyan Chatterjee, Tom Gresik, Nezih Guner, James
Heckman, Tony Kwasnica, Steve Levitt, Glenn Loury, Phil Reny, David Shapiro, Tomas
Sjo ¨stro ¨m, Lars Stole, and seminar participants too numerous to mention. Jo ¨rg Spenkuch
provided exceptional research assistance. A portion of this research was conducted while
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takenly punish employers who did not discriminate while others (who
actually did discriminate) go undetected. It is this informational asym-
metry that gives employers incentives to alter their hiring ratio so as not
to induce an audit.
The results of the simple auditing model are illuminating: all equi-
libria exhibit an implicit-quota property. That is, a nonempty set of
employers (both those who are inclined to discriminate and those who
are not) are willing to alter their behavior to avoid an audit, since there
is a positive probability that the auditor makes a mistake and the penalty
is strictly positive. I use the modiﬁer “implicit” for a particular reason.
If we were deriving explicit quotas, this would be represented by the
government announcing a desired ratio of minorities to nonminorities
and (assuming the penalty for deviating is sufﬁciently large) employers
strictly adhering to this ratio, which has been ruled unconstitutional
(Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265). In
contrast, implicit quotas are those that the employers themselves set, in
equilibrium, as an optimal response to imperfect auditing. Thus, the
quotes that I began with and the rhetoric from both political parties that
supports goals but not quotas have no content.
The lesson is straightforward. If a regulator is interested in enforcing
antidiscrimination laws, then goals are quotas when an auditor has im-
perfect information regarding employers’ desires to discriminate and the
fraction of qualiﬁed minorities who applied to each ﬁrm. Under some
assumptions, explicit quotas are more efﬁcient than implicit quotas.
1
This model, although applied here to auditing in the labor market
(where quotas are most controversial), can naturally be applied to au-
diting environments involving tax evasion, teacher accountability, and
antitrust enforcement.
2
1. Imperfect information is the crucial assumption. Without it, goals and quotas can
be quite different objects. But, in practice, the information auditors have on employers’
discriminatory intentions or the quality of their applicant pools is far from perfect.
2. This paper is related to the well-developed literatures on employment discrimination
and tax compliance. There is a relatively large literature on employment discrimination.
The two main theories are given by Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973). Becker (1957)
provides a taste-based theory of discrimination. In this theory, agents discriminate because
there exist nonpecuniary psychic costs to interaction with minorities. Thus, in this model,
agents are willing to forgo proﬁts or earn lower wages to ensure segregation. Arrow (1973)
discusses a model of statistical discrimination. This model shows that employers can (ra-
tionally) discriminate against a group even when they are ex ante identical. Independent
of the underlying theory of discrimination, it manifests itself in my model by an employer
hiring fewer minorities than they otherwise would. A regulator, then, may want to break
such equilibria. This auditing problem is similar to the extensive literature on tax com-4 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 38 (1) / JANUARY 2009
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a concise but rel-
atively informal verbal description of an auditing model with imperfect
information, and it constructs a numerical example that illustrates the
main results. Section 3 concludes. Appendix A contains the formal model
along with technical proofs of all the results discussed in Section 2.
Appendix B provides additional results from the model.
2. A MODEL OF IMPERFECT AUDITING
Let there be a continuum of workers and a continuum of employers.
Workers belong to one of two groups: minorities or nonminorities.There
are also two types of employers: some are biased against minorities,
while the others are unbiased. There is a set of auditors. Before the start
of the game, the government chooses a penalty to be enforced on em-
ployers who discriminate against minorities in their hiring practices.
Nature moves ﬁrst and assigns a two-dimensional type to each em-
ployer: whether it is biased and the quality of its applicant pool. The
latter is a number on the positive real line, distributed according to a
smooth and continuous cumulative distribution function. One can think
of this number as the proﬁt-maximizing (absent discriminatory taste)
ratio of minorities to nonminorities in an employer’s applicant pool.
3
This formulation is ﬂexible enough to allow for different distributions
of effort, investment, talent, geography, or other factors that might
change the proﬁt-maximizing ratio of minorities to nonminorities an
employer wants to hire.
Next, employers observe their two-dimensional private types and
make hiring decisions. The following provides a formal deﬁnition of
discrimination.
pliance (see Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein [1998] for an overview). Surprisingly, however,
the literature on imperfect auditing is small (Lawarree and Van Audenrode 1992; Kofman
and Lawarree 1993; Bardsley 1996; and, implicitly, Erard and Feinstein 1994). The closest
to my approach is Bardsley (1996), who has a similar model of imperfect auditing. The
key difference involves the auditors’ payoffs.
3. Ideally, one would want to endogenize the employer’s state and allow employers to
make investments to increase their likelihood of being in a “good” state, using the mono-
tonic likelihood ratio property. I do not model these initial investments by the employers
since they are not observable by the auditor. If it helps to ﬁx ideas, one can assume that
the “lottery” of states is determined by investment (that is, recruitment) activities of ﬁrms
outside my model. However, if the function that maps recruiting initiatives to applicant
pools is not deterministic (that is, intense minority recruiting need not always result in a
minority-rich applicant pool), then the exogenous determination of states is without further
loss of generality.IMPLICIT QUOTAS / 5
Deﬁnition 1. A ﬁrm is said to discriminate if it hires a ratio of
minorities to nonminorities that is strictly less than its proﬁt-maximizing
ratio (not including its possible discriminatory taste).
By deﬁnition, unbiased employers hire the proﬁt-maximizing ratio of
minorities to nonminorities, absent regulation. I further assume that
biased employers, absent regulation, hire a strictly lower ratio. In the
language of Becker (1957), one can think of this difference as a dis-
crimination coefﬁcient, while in statistical or cognitive discrimination
models, it may capture the lower share of blacks hired owing to negative
stereotypes (Arrow 1973) or coarser categories (Fryer and Jackson
2008). An auditor, after observing each employer’s hiring decision (not
its type or applicant pool), makes a dichotomous audit decision: audit
or not. If the auditor decides to conduct an audit, she makes a correct
assessment of the employer with probability greater than a half, and she
makes a mistake with the complementary probability. After the audit,
the auditor decides whether to issue the ﬁne.
4 It isimportanttoemphasize
that discrimination here is thought to be one-sided: a regulator is au-
diting hiring practices to lessen discrimination against minorities that
exists absent regulation. In a more elaborate model, one can add pen-
alties for overshooting and discriminating against nonminorities.
An employer’s payoffs are represented by a single-peaked function
that reaches its maximum when the employer hires its optimal ratio of
minorities to nonminorities, taking into account its applicant pool and
possible discriminatory preferences. Auditors receive a positive payoff
if they punish a discriminating employer and suffer a cost if they do not
ﬁne a discriminating employer or mistakenly ﬁne a nondiscriminator.
5
The payoff to an auditor for not punishing a nondiscriminator is nor-
malized to zero.
It is assumed that auditors are interested only inﬁndingandpunishing
employers who discriminate against minorities. They do not care about
employers’ (possibly) biased preferences toward minorities, as long as
they do not use discriminatory hiring practices. To keep things simple,
I assume that all payoff-relevant parameters are exogenously given.
4. Realistically, the punishment should be proportional to the level of discrimination.
Adding more elaborate penalty functions will make interesting changes in the qualitative
properties of the equilibria. But if the penalty is strictly positive for all discriminatory acts,
my main result holds.
5. Assuming that the auditor receives negative utility from punishing a nondiscrimi-
nator is equivalent to the limited-liability assumption in the tax literature.6 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 38 (1) / JANUARY 2009
2.1. Equilibrium
To solve the model, I focus on pure-strategy equilibria in which each
agent makes a deterministic choice and all individuals of the same type
make the same choice.
6 The solution concept for the auditing model,
per usual for signaling games, is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Intui-
tively, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a set of strategies and beliefs
such that, at any stage of the game, strategies are optimal given the
beliefs, and beliefs are obtained from equilibrium strategiesandobserved
actions using Bayes’s rule. In what follows, I describe existential results
for two possible sets of equilibria: separating and semiseparating. All
formal statements of the propositions, along with their proofs, can be
found in Appendix A. Appendix B treats the possibility of pooling, non-
monotonic, and mixed-strategy equilibria.
2.1.1. Separating Equilibrium. For (standard)monotonicsignalingmod-
els, in a fully separating equilibrium, an agent of each type chooses a
unique action, and each type is correctly identiﬁed in equilibrium. In
this (slightly nonstandard) nonmonotonic signaling game, fullseparation
is ruled out a priori, owing to continuous types and strategy spaces. In
particular, for every hiring ratio there exist two applicant pools—one
richer in qualiﬁed minorities than the other—such that a biased employer
with the better pool will hire the same number of minorities as an un-
biased employer with fewer qualiﬁed minorities among her applicants.
Consider the following (slightly perturbed) deﬁnition of a separating
equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2. In any pseudoseparating equilibrium, each employer
hires its proﬁt-maximizing ratio of minorities to nonminorities.
The ﬁrst result (proposition 1, Appendix A) highlights the fact that
no pseudoseparating equilibrium exists. Any effort on the auditor’s part
to ﬁnd and punish discriminators will necessarily yield an implicit
quota (employers will hire more minorities than they would in their proﬁt-
maximizing workforce). Thisisthemainthemeofthepaper.Thesurprising
6. A strategy for an employer is an assignment function that maps its private type to
a ratio of minorities to nonminorities hired. A strategy for an auditor is a function that
maps an employer’s observed ratio of minorities to nonminorities hired to an auditdecision.
To begin, I restrict attention to monotonic strategies for the auditor (that is, cutoffs), in
which she audits any employer with an observed ratio of minorities to nonminorities below
the cutoff and does not audit any employer with an observed ratio above it. This is without
loss of generality when the auditor uses pure strategies (see Appendix B).IMPLICIT QUOTAS / 7
part of this result is that biased and unbiased employers alike may adhere
to the implicit quota.
Some believe that quota-like hiring from employers would be an easier
pill to swallow if the market were not accounting for tastes, and the threat
of an audit simply forced biased employers to hire workforce ratios that
were equivalent to what unbiased employers would optimally hire, con-
ditional on the same applicant pool.
7 This is possible if the auditor has
perfect information. However, some may ﬁnd it disturbing that, given the
auditor’s lack of information, even unbiased employers are willing to alter
their hiring ratios so as not to induce an audit, especially when (as prop-
osition 1 proves) this behavior is inevitable, for at least some employers.
2.1.2. Semiseparating Equilibria. There are two types of semiseparating
equilibria, which I label “marginal” and “inclusive.” The distinction
between them hinges on what types of employers choose to pool on the
implicit quota. Marginal equilibria require that only marginal employers
(employers whose proﬁt-maximizing hiring ratios are relatively close to
the implicit quota) adhere to the implicit quota. In this type of equilib-
rium, employers with applicant pools that have very few qualiﬁed mi-
norities refuse to alter their hiring ratios enough to avoid an audit,
because the proﬁt loss in doing so is large relative to the expected cost
of being audited. They simply incur the expected cost. As the ﬁne for
being deemed a discriminator gets large, fewer employers will risk the
penalty, and inclusive equilibria will result.Inaninclusivesemiseparating
equilibrium, all employers (whether or not they are biased) who face a
proﬁt-maximizing hiring ratio below the implicit quota will alter their
behavior and hire right up to the implicit quota. Note that marginal
equilibria are the only equilibria for which audits occur in equilibrium.
In this sense, one may ﬁnd them more appealing and empiricallyrelevant.
Whether marginal or inclusive equilibria result depends solely on the
magnitude of the penalty for discriminating. If the expected penalties
are relatively small, marginal equilibria exist (proposition 2, Appendix
A); if the expected penalties are large, inclusive equilibria result (prop-
osition 3, Appendix A).
The technical conditions to ensure a marginal equilibrium require
that all employers with relatively small fractions of qualiﬁed minorities
in their applicant pools hire their proﬁt-maximizing workforce.Thisputs
an upper bound on the penalty that can be imposed in equilibrium. The
7. However, others believe that not accounting for market tastes is a mistake, even if
it means that some groups endure discriminatory treatment (see Epstein 1992).8 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 38 (1) / JANUARY 2009
conditions also ensure that there is always a set of positive measure of
employers who alter their proﬁt-maximizing workforces by “jumping
up” to the implicit quota. And, given this behavior from employers, the
auditor does not ﬁnd it worthwhile to audit at that quota.Theconditions
for inclusive equilibrium ensure that the expected costs of being audited
are sufﬁciently high to dissuade potential deviators, and the implicit
quota is high enough to minimize the amount of discrimination in equi-
librium, so that the auditor does not ﬁnd it optimal to audit the em-
ployers who pile up at the quota even though she knows that some of
them are discriminating.
A simple numerical example illustrates many of the points stressed
thus far. Assume that the auditor believes an employerwhohiresacertain
ratio of minorities to nonminorities to be a discriminator with a prob-
ability of one minus the hiring ratio. Further, assume that the auditor
receives a payoff of one if she correctly punishes a discriminator and
incurs a penalty of one if she mistakenly ﬁnes a nondiscriminating em-
ployer. Finally, assume that the probability of making a correct assess-
ment is 80 percent and the costs of conducting an audit are ﬁxed at
. Under these circumstances, the auditor will ﬁnd it optimal to audit
7
10
all employers who hire less than 50 percent minorities (see Appendix A
for derivation). The employer’s utility function reaches a maximum of
zero when it hires its proﬁt-maximizing ratio. Whenever an employer
deviates from this ratio, he receives a penalty equal to the squared de-
viation. Also, suppose that discriminating employers will hire only half
the number of minorities an otherwise equal, unbiased employer would
hire. Under these assumptions, a marginal semiseparating equilibrium
will exist if the ﬁne is set to . Then, all employers, whether they are
5
64
discriminators or not, with optimal hiring ratios between and will
31
82
alter their behavior and hire 50 percent minorities. Those employers
who would hire less than will not change their hiring decisions but
3
8
rather incur the expected costs of being audited. Employers who would
hire more than 50 percent anyway will also not deviate, as they will not
be audited in equilibrium. If, however, the ﬁne is set higher than , then
5
4
an inclusive semiseparating equilibrium exists. That is, all employers
who would otherwise hire a fraction of minorities smaller than will
1
2
now hire exactly up to this line to avoid the possibility of being ﬁned
by the auditor. All other employers will, again, not deviate from their
optimal hiring ratios.IMPLICIT QUOTAS / 9
2.2. The Multiplicity Problem
In typical signaling models, one is plagued with the multiplicity of equi-
libria owing to the freedom associated with out-of-equilibrium beliefs
in standard solution concepts. For example, suppose that we have an
inclusive equilibrium with a lower-bound hiring ratio, and the auditor
happens to observe an employer who hires below that ratio. In this case,
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium does not specify the auditors’ infer-
ences; thus, it is theoretically plausible that an auditor will believe that
any deviations below that ratio certainly indicate discriminators. She
could just as easily believe that they are nondiscriminators. She is
free to choose. As a result of the lackadaisical requirements on out-of-
equilibrium beliefs imposed by Bayesian perfection,wehaveacontinuum
of potential equilibria (propositions 4 and 5, Appendix A). For instance,
we know that in any equilibrium the auditor does not want to audit
employers who pile up on the implicit quota. Well, there is a continuum
of possible implicit quotas above which an auditor is indifferent. With
out-of-equilibrium beliefs that anyone who hires beneath the implicit
quota is a discriminator, all of these possibilities are equilibria.
This type of multiplicity problem is an unfortunate result that stiﬂes
the predictive power of most signaling models. However, it can beargued
that the out-of-equilibrium beliefs needed to construct the equilibria
above are not empirically relevant. In particular, it may be unreasonable
to assume that every deviation from a candidate equilibrium is a dis-
criminator. Cho and Kreps (1987) posed an equilibrium reﬁnement
known as the “intuitive criterion.” This criterion was constructed to aid
in choosing among the multiplicity of possible equilibria found in most
signaling games. The criterion is applied in my model in a series of steps.
1. For any deviation from a candidate equilibrium, deﬁne a set of
types that would receive less than their equilibrium payoff by making
the deviation, provided that the auditor plays an undominated strategy.
2. Deﬁne a set of types that would necessarily be better off byemploying
the deviating ratio, given that the auditor knows that the deviation would
not be affected by any employer in the set deﬁned in step 1.
3. If the set deﬁned in step 2 is nonempty, the equilibrium fails the
intuitive criterion.
In many (standard) signaling models, this reﬁnement has eliminated
the multiplicity problem. Cho and Kreps (1987) show, in the Spence
(1973) model of job market signaling, that the intuitive criterion selects
the separating equilibrium with the least amount of inefﬁcient signaling.10 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 38 (1) / JANUARY 2009
Unfortunately, it has absolutely no bite in the current (nonstandard)
model.
8 Proposition 6 shows that all semiseparating equilibria (marginal
and inclusive) survive after applying the intuitive criterion.
To see this, consider the three-step veriﬁcationprocessoutlinedabove.
The proposition shows that the set of employers who strictly prefer their
equilibrium payoff to any deviation is precisely the set of employers who
are hiring their ﬁrst-best ratio above the implicit quota. We know that
an equilibrium fails the intuitive criterion if there existsatypewhowould
necessarily be better off by deviating, given that the auditor will know
that the deviation did not occur in any employer hiring its ﬁrst-best
ratio. However, there does not exist such a type because there is still a
positive probability of being penalized even when an employer is not
discriminating. In other words, imperfect information after the audit
undermines the intuitive criterion.
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Many individuals have an allergic reaction to the use of quotas but
seemingly want to eliminate discrimination by enforcing antidiscrimi-
nation laws. The main result in this paper shows that enforcing anti-
discrimination policy has the unintended effect of causing all equilibria
to involve a set of employers who alter their hiring ratios to avoid being
audited, on account of the auditor’s lack of information. In essence,
goals are quotas whenever auditing technology is not perfect. And,under
some assumptions, goals and targets can lead to more extreme quota-
like hiring. Attacking afﬁrmative action as a quota for minorities while
endorsing goals and antidiscrimination enforcement is vacuous.
These results extend in natural and interesting ways to other realms
of law and economics. For example, in a tax evasion model, the results
indicate that there exist equilibria in which “honest” taxpayers are will-
ing to overreport so that they are not ﬁned. Future research in these
areas can be extended along many dimensions. First, it would be inter-
esting to construct a dynamic or repeated model of the auditing process
in order to highlight the difﬁculties an auditor has in identifying dis-
crimination in promotion policies relative to identifying discrimination
in initial hiring. Auditors indicate that the former is much more difﬁcult
8. This is also true for the stronger Dominance 1 (D1) and equilibrium dominance
test, which requires one to believe, with probability one, that the type that deviated is the
one who has the most incentive.IMPLICIT QUOTAS / 11
to monitor. A repeated-game model would have the advantage of em-
ployer reputations. Second, as mentioned in the text, one may want to
endogenize the applicant pools in two dimensions: (1) allow workers to
make human capital investments and (2) allow employers to invest in
recruiting initiatives in hopes of being given a better pool of potential
workers. Another viable extension might be a model in which workers
can accuse their employer of discriminating. In fact, the U.S. Department
of Labor has a discrimination complaint form on its Web page. Since
most of the money collected by the Ofﬁce of Federal Contract Compli-
ance Programs is distributed among those workers who ﬁle the com-
plaints, it may be interesting to examine the strategic relationships at
play within this environment.
APPENDIX A: FORMAL MODEL AND PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
A1. The Basic Building Blocks
There is a continuum of workers and a continuum of employers, each with unit
measure. There are two groups of workers: a measure are minorities, and l
are nonminorities. There are also two types of employers: a measure are 1 lm
biased against minorities, and a measure are unbiased. There is also a 1 m
large set of auditors. The government chooses a ﬁne P before the start of the
game.
Nature moves ﬁrst and assigns a type to each employer, where (t, a) t p b
or if an employer is biased or unbiased, respectively, and distributes an t p u
applicant pool to each employer according to a smooth and continuous a  [g, a]
cumulative distribution function and related density , where represents F(a) f(a) a
the proﬁt-maximizing (absent discriminatory taste) ratio of minorities to non-
minorities in an employer’s applicant pool. To avoid trivialities, I assume that
every applicant pool has at least one minority candidate.Next,employersobserve
their two-dimensional private type, , and make a workforce decision (t, a) r(t,
. a)  [0, )
By deﬁnition, ; that is, absent regulation, unbiased employers hire r(u, a) p a
the proﬁt-maximizing ratio of minorities to nonminorities. When optimizing,
biased employers will hire a ratio , , absent regulation. An (1  a)a a  (0, 1)
auditor, after observing (not or ), makes a dichotomous audit decision: audit rt a
or not. If the auditor decides to conduct an audit, she makes a correct assessment
of the employer with probability , and she makes a mistake with probability
1 f 1
2
. After the audit, the auditor makes a punishment decision, deciding 1 f
whether or not to issue the ﬁne . P12 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 38 (1) / JANUARY 2009
A2. Payoffs
Employers’ payoffs are represented by a function for unbiased G[r(u, a)  a]
employers and a function for biased employers. I make the G[r(b, a)  (1  a)a]
following assumptions on . G(7)
Assumption 1. The function is twice continuously differentiable, strictly G(z)
concave, and symmetric ( ) and achieves a maximum of zero when G(z) p G(z)
. z p 0
Let denote the costs to the auditor of engaging in an audit of an employer. b 1 0
Auditors receive a payoff if they punish a discriminating employer and suffer x 1 b
a cost  if they do not ﬁne a discriminating employer or mistakenly ﬁne a c ! 0
nondiscriminator. The payoff to an auditor for not punishing a nondiscriminator
is normalized to zero. I assume that , and are exogenously given. P, x, c b
A3. Strategies
A strategy for an employer is an assignment function that maps its private type
to a ratio of minorities to nonminorities hired. A strategy for an auditor (t, a)
is a function that maps an employer’s observed ratio of minorities to nonmi-
norities hired to an audit decision.
To begin, I restrict attention to monotonic strategies for the auditor (that (Q)
is, cutoffs), in which she audits any employer with an observed ratio of minorities
to nonminorities and does not audit any employer with an observed ratio r ! Q
. This is without loss of generality when the auditor uses pure strategies r ≥ Q
(see Appendix B).
A4. Expected Payoffs
Let denote the probability that the employer is discriminating, conditional W(r)
on hiring a workforce r.
9 The auditor’s expected payoff of not conducting an
audit is  . When optimizing, the auditor believes that the employer is W(r)c
discriminating with probability and punishes him with W(r)f  [1 W(r)](1  f)
payoff . With probability W(r)fx [1 W(r)](1  f)c W(r)(1  f)  [1 W(r)]f,
she thinks that the employer is not discriminating and does not punish him (since
she receives negative payoff for doing so). The auditor’s expected payoff can be
written as
W(r)fx (1  f)c b.
The employer’s expected payoffs depend on his proﬁt-maximizing hiring ra-
tio, the auditor’s cutoff strategy, and the expected cost of being audited. An
unbiased employer’s expected payoff of employing a workforce is r(u, a)
if he discriminates and if he G[r(u, a)  a]  fPdG [r(u, a)  a]  (1  f)Pd ! ! rQ rQ
9. The explicit derivation of will be equilibrium speciﬁc. W(r)IMPLICIT QUOTAS / 13
does not, where is a standard indicator function. Similarly, a biased employer’s d
expected payoff of employing a workforce is r(b, a) G[r(b, a)  (1  a)a] 
if he discriminates and if he does not. fPdG [r(b, s)  (1  a)a]  (1  f)Pd ! ! rQ rQ
With this notation in hand, I can provide the values needed to recreate the
numerical example discussed in the text: , , , and
4 W(r) p 1 r f p x p c p 1
5
. The resulting value of is . Unbiased and biased employers are given
71 b p Q
10 2
by and , respectively; ; for
15 22 G(r) p (a r) G(r) p [(1  a)a r] a p P p
26 4
a marginal equilibrium and for an inclusive equilibrium; and .
53 ˆ P 1 r p
48
Proposition 1. No pseudoseparating equilibrium exists.
Proof. To see that no pseudoseparating equilibrium exists, it is sufﬁcient to
show that at least one employer will have an incentive to deviate from its ﬁrst-
best ratio whenever . Consider the employer who has a proﬁt-maximizing f ! 1
workforce with a ratio smaller than the auditor’s threshold . (We know this (Q)
employer exists because of the continuity assumptions.) For an unbiased employer
whose ﬁrst-best ratio is slightly less than the expected auditing threshold, the
following equation must hold:
G(0)(1f)P 1 G().
We know by assumption, so G(0) p 0
(1f)P 1 G().
However, for any ﬁxed , there exists a value of small enough such that fP 1 0 
this inequality does not hold. Note that is ruled out by the deﬁnition of Q p 0
. Q.E.D.
✻ r
Next, I provide two deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 3. In a marginal semiseparating equilibrium, for all r(u, a) p Q
, for all , for all ˆˆ a  [a, Q] r(u, a) p aa  [0, a]∪[Q, a] r[b, a/(1a)] p Qa 
, and for all . ˆˆ [a/(1a), Q/(1a)] r[b, a/(1a)] p aa  [0, a]∪[Q, a]
Deﬁnition 4. In an inclusive semiseparating equilibrium, for r(u, a) p Q
all , for all , for all a  [0, Q] r(u, a) p aa  [Q, a] r[b, a/(1a)] p Qa  [0,
, and for all . Q/(1a)] r[b, a/(1a)] p aa  [Q, a]
And let satisfy
✻ r 1 0
✻ mf[r /(1 a)] b  (1  f)c
✻ W(r ) pp . ✻✻ mf[r /(1 a)]  (1  m)f(r ) xf c
In words, is the smallest ratio for which the auditor does not ﬁnd it optimal
✻ rr
to audit when employers are hiring their ﬁrst-best ratios. The next result provides
an existential result for a marginal equilibrium.14 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 38 (1) / JANUARY 2009
Proposition 2. A marginal equilibrium exists if and only if there exists an
such that the following conditions hold: ˆ r  (0, Q)
ˆ fG [r/(1a)Q] b(1f)c
ˆ p for some r  [0, Q], W(Q) ≤ ,
ˆ 1fG (rQ) xfc
and any deviation (out-of-equilibrium event) is thought to indicate a
  ˆ r  [r, Q]
discriminator.
Proof. By deﬁnition, in any marginal semiseparating equilibrium,thereexists
a nonempty set of employers such that . r(t, a) ! Q
Claim 1. In any semiseparating equilibrium, if , r(t, a) ! Qr (t, a)  {a(1
. a), a}
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose . In this case, he will choose that (t, a) p (b, a) r
satisﬁes
fP,
max G(aa)(1f)P, for some z 1 a. {}
G[z(1a)a](1f)P
However, the second term is always larger than the third, so I can rewrite this as
fP,
max . {} G(aa)(1f)P
A similar argument shows that type employers will hire , which is the (u, a) a
desired result for claim 1.
Then, there must exist a ratio (strict inequality follows directly from ˆ r ! Q
) such that any employer with hires and any employer with ﬁrst- ˆ f ! 1 a ! ra
best ratio hires . Thus, the employer with must be indifferent ˆˆ a  (r, Q] Qa p r
between hiring his ﬁrst-best ratio and hiring . Further, we know that for any Q
ratio , there exists such that . Therefore, we know ra r [b, a/(1 a)] p r(u, a) p r
that at ratio , there is an unbiased employer in state and a biased employer ˆ ˆ ra
in state . To ensure that both employers are indifferent at , the following ˆ ˆ a/(1 a) r
equations must hold:
ˆ (1  f)P p G(Q a)
for unbiased types, which implies that , and ˆ P p G(Q a)/(1  f)
ˆ fP p G[Q a(1  a)]
for biased types, which implies that . Thus, if ˆ P p G[Q a(1  a)]/ff /(1
, both equations are satisﬁed simultaneously. ˆˆ f) p G[Q a(1  a)]/G(Q a)IMPLICIT QUOTAS / 15
To make it optimal for the employer to audit below , but not audit at or Q
above, it must be that ,
✻ ˆ r ≤ r
Q/(1a) m f(a)da ˆ ∫r(Q)/(1a) b  (1  f)c
≤ , Q/(1a) Q xf c m f(a)da (1  m) f(a)da ˆˆ ∫∫ r(Q)/(1a) r(Q)
and , respectively. Q.E.D.
✻ Q ≥ r
Proposition 3. An inclusive equilibrium exists if and only if the following
conditions hold:
G(Q) G(Q) b(1f)c
P 1 max , , W(Q) ≤ , {} 1ff x f c
and any deviation (out-of-equilibrium event) is thought to indicate a
  r  [0, Q]
discriminator.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists separation to the
left of . Given claim 1 above, there must exist a ratio (strict inequality ˆ Qr ! Q
again follows directly from ) such that any employer with hires and ˆ f ! 1 a ! ra
any employer with ﬁrst-best ratio hires . Thus, the employer with ˆ a  (r, Q] Q
must be indifferent between hiring his ﬁrst-best ratio and hiring . Further, ˆ a p rQ
we know that for any ratio , there exists such that ra r [b, a/(1a)] p r(u, a) p
. Therefore, we know at ratio that there is an unbiased employer in state and ˆ ˆ rr a
a biased employer in state . To ensure that both employers are indifferent ˆ a/(1a)
at , the following equations must hold: ˆ r
ˆ (1f)P p G(Qa)
for unbiased types and
ˆ fP p G[Qa(1a)]
for biased types. Given
G[a (1a)Q] G(aQ)
a 1 0, P 1 max , , {} 1ff
both equations cannot be satisﬁed simultaneously. Therefore, we need or for ˆˆ rr bu
biased or unbiased types, respectively, where , which satisﬁes ˆˆ r ! r bu
ˆ G(Qr ) u P p 
(1f)
and
ˆ G(Qr ) b P p  .
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Thus,
ˆ fG (Qr ) b p ,
ˆ 1fG (Qr ) u
which is a contradiction (the right-hand side is greater than one, and the left-hand
side is less than one, by deﬁnition). Q.E.D.
Let
mf[r/(1 a)]
g(r) {
mf[r/(1 a)]  (1  m)f(r)
denote the probability that a proﬁt-maximizing ratio is hired by a biased r
employer, where denotes the fraction of biased employers in the labor market. m
I assume that .
10   g (r) ! 0
Proposition 4. There exists a vector ( ) such that for any , an Q, PQ ≥ Q
inclusive semiseparating equilibrium exists if all (out-of-equilibrium events)
  r ! Q
are deemed discriminators.
Proof. Let
m Q/(1a)f(a)da b(1f)c Q Q { min Q : ≤ . {} m Q/(1a)f(a)da(1m) Qf(a)da xfc 00
It follows directly from proposition 3 that for any , the conditions of the Q ≥ Q
proposition are met if deviators below are thought to be discriminators and Q
is sufﬁciently high. Now, it sufﬁces to show that (1f)P
Q/(1a) m f(a)da ∫Q
Q/(1a) Q m f(a)da(1m) f(a)da ∫∫ 00
is decreasing in , for . Since
✻ QQ  [max{r , Q}, a]
Q/(1a) m f(a)da ∫Q
W(Q) p , Q/(1a) Q m f(a)da(1m) f(a)da ∫∫ 00
we have the desired result. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5. There exists a vector ( ) such that for any , a ˆ Q, P, rQ ≥ Q
marginal semiseparating equilibrium exists if all employers who choose
  ˆ r  [r,
(out-of-equilibrium event) are deemed discriminators. Q]
Proof. Recall that, in equilibrium, . The rest follows directly from prop- ˆ r(Q)
osition 4. Q.E.D.
10. Taking the ﬁrst-order derivative, if and only if
     g ! 0[ f (r)]/[f(r)] 1 {f [r/(1 
.This is the same condition as decreasing in , which is a)]}/{(1  a)f[r/(1  a)]} lnf(r) r
consistent with many distributional assumptions on . fIMPLICIT QUOTAS / 17
Proposition 6. All semiseparating equilibria satisfy the intuitive criterion.
Proof. Using the notation found in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 448),
let denote the set of types, with any particular type denoted V p {u, b}#[0, a]
; denote the auditor’s choice variable, where if she v p (t, a) A  {0, 1} A p 1
decides to audit; and denote the auditor’s beliefs and the auditor’s
  y u(r , A, v)
payoff. Now, deﬁne the set of auditor best responses as
   BR(V, r ) p ∪ BR(y, r ), y : y(VFr)p1
where
     BR(y, r ) p argmax y(vFr )u(r , A, v). 
A vV
Let denote the equilibrium payoff to a type employer. Deﬁne a set
✻ u (v) v E
  ✻   J(r ) p {v : u (v) 1 max u (r , A, v)}. EE
ABR(V, r)
It is straightforward to see that this set consists of all values of such that v
. Therefore, rewrite as
✻   r ≥ QJ (r ) v
  ✻ J(r ) p {v : r ≥ Q}. v
By deﬁnition, the equilibrium fails the intuitive criterion if for some values of
there exists a such that
   r v  V
✻      u (v ) ! min u (r , A, v ). EE
   ABR(V/J(r ), r )
However, since the set contains discriminators and contains
     VJ(r ) BR[VJ(r ), r ]
, it follows that A p 1
  ✻      {v  V : u (v ) ! min u (r , A, v )} p M, EE
   ABR(V/J(r ), r )
which is the desired result. A virtually identical argument proves the analogous
result for the set of marginal semiseparating equilibria. Q.E.D.
APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL CALCULATIONS
B1. Pooling Equilibria
In a pooling equilibrium, all types choose the same action. In particular, apooling
equilibrium exists at if for all , . In what r (t, a)  {b, u}# [0, a] r(t, a) p r p p
follows, I prove the existence of a unique pooling equilibrium for my general
model.
Proposition 7. If , a unique pooling equilibrium exists at P 1 G(a)/(1f)
, provided that the auditor believes all employers who hire are r p ar ! r p p
discriminating.18 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 38 (1) / JANUARY 2009
Proof. Suppose that for all , , and that the auditor does not (t, a) r(t, a) p a
audit any employer with hiring ratio but audits any employer with . The ar ! a
auditor has no incentive to deviate from this strategy, since she knows that there
is no possibility that anyone with is discriminating, and it is consistent for r p a
her to believe that any deviators are discriminating. For employers, no one has
incentive to deviate, since they will be audited and . To establish P 1 G(a)/(1f)
uniqueness, suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists a pooling equilib-
rium at . In this case, , for all. However, this implies that r ! a (t, a) r(t, a) p r pp
even an unbiased employer in state ﬁnds it best to deviate. In symbols, this a
requires that , since the auditor will not ﬁnd it optimal to investigate 0 ! G(r a) p
any employer with . This contradicts the assumptions on . Q.E.D. r p a G(7)
This proposition provides a knife-edge possibility for the existence of pooling
equilibria. The result seems innocuous due to the fact that I do not allow for
reverse discrimination in my simple model. This would alleviate such an extreme
pooling equilibrium, although I am not certain whether it could guarantee the
nonexistence of less extreme pooling equilibria.
B2. Nonmonotonic Equilibria
In my analysis thus far, I have restricted my attention to monotonic auditing
strategies. In this section, I relax that assumption and analyze the existence of
equilibria in which the auditor sets nonmonotonic threshold strategies.
11 These
strategies involve multiple auditing thresholds. This implies that the auditor
believes there are certain minority/nonminority hiring ratios that are “just right”:
anything too low or too high is suspect. The ﬁnal technical result shows that
nonmonotonic equilibria do not exist in pure strategies.
Proposition 8. No nonmonotonic equilibrium exists.
Proof. In any nonmonotonic equilibrium, there exist at least two auditorial
thresholds and , where it is assumed, without loss of generality, that QQ Q ! 12 1
. Then for all the auditor wants to audit, and for all she does not Qr 1 Qr ≤ Q 22 2
(otherwise one could assume one auditing threshold without loss). Q.E.D.
We know that . However, it can be shown that . Suppose Q  (Q , a] Q p a 21 2
not. Then any employer whose ﬁrst-best hiring ratio hires . However, a ≥ QQ 22
this can never be optimal for the type employer, given that he is guaranteed (u, a)
not to be audited if he hires his ﬁrst-best ratio. Therefore, the only possible
nonmonotonic equilibria requires . I rule this case out a priori, given Q ! Q p a 12
that this boils down to the auditor using a monotonic strategy (since she must
audit only an employer with a hiring ratio greater than ). a
11 Technically speaking, these equilibria are in the set of semiseparating equilibria.IMPLICIT QUOTAS / 19
B3. Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
For the auditor to play a mixed strategy between multiple thresholds, she must
be indifferent between auditing and not at these thresholds. Therefore, W(r) p
must have multiple solutions. For tractability, let [b  (1 f)c]/(xf c)
b  (1  f)c
Y { r : W(r) p {} xf c
denote the set of such solutions with its cardinality . Finally, let FYF  [1, ] rj
denote the probability that an auditor audits at threshold , where we assume Qj
without loss that . Q ! Q ! ... ! Q 12 # Y
The employer’s problem is straightforward. A type employer hires (t, a)
his ﬁrst-best ratio if that hiring ratio is above ; employers whose proﬁt- Q#Y
maximizing hiring ratio is below choose Q#Y
(1  f)P, 
G(Q  a)(1  r )(1  f)P, 11  G(Q  a)(1  r )(1  f)P, 22 max G(Q  a)(1  r )(1  f)P, #Y #Y
... , 
G(Q  s)  #Y
if unbiased and
fP,
G(Q  (1  a)a)  (1  r )fP, 11 max
G(Q  a)  (1  r )(1  f)P, {} 11
...
if biased.
For the auditor, it must be that for all
r W(Q ) p [b  (1 f)c]/(xf c) j
. Given the general framework for mixed-strategy equilibria, one can
r Q  Y j
check mixed strategies for particular parameter values as needed.
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